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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

19 November 1974

Dear Dick:

The attached report was given to me by someone who had received it on a TWA airplane from a fellow traveler.

I wonder if you have any knowledge of the people who prepare and promulgate the report, and what is their orientation. Also, I think it would be interesting to separate the wheat from the chaff on the content. Obviously, there is a lot of good information and, I suspect, a great deal of distortion.

Your comment would be appreciated.

Sincerely,

George W. Anderson, Jr.

Admiral, USN (Ret.)


Chairman

Major General Vernon A. Walters, USA Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Central Intelligence Agency Washington, D. C. 20505

Encl.

PARIS

VOLUME XVII - LETTER 3 - JUNE, 1974



Portugal: THE DISASTER

Before dawn on April 25, 1974, military columns were moving toward Lisbon. By 4:20 A.M. rebel units had occupied Lisbon Airport, Radio Clube Portugal and Portugese Television. Another column surrounded army headquarters and the "Movement of the Armed Forces" broadcast its first orders warning the police, the Republican National Guard, the Portuguese Legion and the Fiscal Guard not to move.

By 1:30 P.M. it was all over. General Antonio de Spinola introduced the new junta over Portuguese Television and excited mobs poured through Lisbon's streets.

Mario Soares, the socialist leader, began packing his luggage in the Paris flat were he had been living since 1970. But he was not going directly home. His first stop would be London, for talks with Harold Wilson's Labor Party and the Socialist International.

While the world spotlight was on the monocled general who was to be Portugal's Kerensky, and the socialist

exile from Paris who had worked for years to clear the way for Portugal's Lenin, Alvar Cunhal, the veteran communist who had spent twelve years in Moscow and Prague was preparing to come home and gather the fruits. Delegates from the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) in Brussels converged on Lisbon, headed by their own revolution-sower through labor action, Irving Brown.

In Mozambique long-haired students threw caution to the winds and gave the clenched fist salute. In Madeira banners decrying capitalism and eulogizing Che Guevara were paraded outside San Lourenço Palace, where ex-President Tomaz and ex-Premier Caetano were in custody.

Under a May 6 dateline the New York Times expressed surprise that "the Communist Party has emerged from underground, from prison and from exile to become the strongest and best organized political force in the new Portugal." The London Daily Telegraph of May 17 declared that by Portugal's swift coalescence into trade unions and political parties of every hue "civic responsibility has been shown that more mature Western democracies could well envy....No mean accomplishment this, for a country deprived of political training, short of cadres and obsessed with colonial problems and the wars it finally realized were unwinnable." What did the Daily Telegraph mean: "deprived of political training, short of cadres!" For years the world's toughest revolutionaries had been burrowing at Portugal's underpinnings with vestern labor leaders, intelligence services, editors and organizations racing to see who could provide money, agitation and trained cadres the fastest to topple the government in Lisbon and throw Portugal's African provinces open for a blood bath. As for wars the country "finally realized were unwinnable," Portugal Section 2003(08/25:CARDRS0R917318001909200338 because

the government was not supporting their efforts to win the war and they were not going to take the blame Approved For Release 2003/08/25: CIA-RDP80R01731R001900020033-8

After the high-sounding speeches about democracy came the inevitable: Monuments along the Avenida de Liberdade were daubed with hammers and sickles and leftist slogans. The officers in power did nothing so the next slogans said "Send the Junta to Brazil." Students began sacking their teachers. In businesses and factories managers were suspended by workers. Mobs with a single face and it of hatred paraded through the streets. Lenin was moving up on Kerensky and no one should have been surprised. In the days before Dr. Salazar came to power, steel-lined walls were the fashion in Portugal. Those who could afford it lined the fronts of their homes with metal as protection against bomb-throwers. After almost half a century of comparative quiet, Portugal's bomb-throwers came out of the shadows again in mid-1971, and those living in the old houses with steel fronts reflected that the national character had not changed, it had only been kept in hand. Now the restraints are crumbling and Portugal is back where she was before Salazar, but with a difference: This time the terrorists are international and the world appears to be on their side. For an understanding of how steel walls became the mode again, one must go back to the years following World War II.

"COLONEL EDMOND." There were many agents at work to destroy the governments of Spain and Portugal. One of them was a Portuguese with Brazilian nationality named Appolonio de Carvalho, who had helped lead an uprising in the Brazilian military academy in 1935. Two years later he turned up in the International Brigade in Spain. When Franco won, he fled into France and helped sabotage the French war effort after Stalin's pact with Hitler. The French threw him in prison. When Hitler invaded Russia he was released and commanded a unit of foreign reds in the Resistance under the name of "Colonel Edmond." Red recommendations brought him the Legion of Honor, the Croix de Guerre and the Resistance medal.

In 1947 he disappeared, to surface in Mexico with the secret Latin-American Iberian office of the Kominform. Colonel Furmanov, assigned to Buenos Aires as a diplomat, headed the South American bureau plotting revolutions in Spain and Portugal. Working with him were Mikhail Pavlenko, Russian, Luka Bellemarie, Rumanian, Colonel Alberto Bayo, who later trained Castro's guerrillas, Garcia, the former head of the secret police in Madrid, and Paolo Moraes, the Portuguese.

In 1949 the American campaign against Spain was at its peak. Le Xuan, the Vietnamese red whom Robert Knapp (now at Wesleyan University in Connecticut) had hired in 1945 for OSS and passed on to CIA, was in Madrid under newspaper correspondent cover. He was in touch with French and Vietnamese reds working to sabotage France's war efforts in Indo-China, and revolutionaries from the Iberian Peninsula. De Carvalho, as the most cunning and experienced agent in the Mexico City bureau, was sent on a top secret mission to Lisbon in February 1949 followed by Paolo Moraes, to take over the Iberian Peninsula apparatus of the Kominform.

Orders were to reorganize the lines between Spain, Portugal, Latin America and the communists in exile in France. Moraes traveled via Marseille on a Luxembourg passport which concealed the fact that he was a captain in the Soviet Army and that from 1945 to 1947 he had been top-supervisor of the red leaders heading Iberian networks. With him were Enricos Lister, known as General Listytsin in the NKVD, Lazarus Fakete, the Hungarian known as "Kleber," and a military specialist whose code name was "Cordon." Handling American intelligence in Paris at the time as head of the Research and Analysis branch of State Department Intelligence was Jay Lovestone, former Secretary-General of the Communist Party USA. (When red-directed revolts had "liberated" French, British and Belgian colonies in Africa, Lovestone left his job as AFL-CIO mobilizer of Black African votes in UN to become head of the Foreign Affairs Section of the AFL-CIO.)

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THE GROUNDWORK FOR PREVENTION. Release 2003/08/25 CIA ROPES SM01731Re0120002003 Fo-allied stand during the war was undisputed, so Portuguese subversion was conducted as part of the campaign against Spain. De Carvalho and Moraes met their lieutenants regularly in Porto, under the protection of Portuguese dockers. Communications with Spanish networks were through the frontier village of Real de San Antonio. Sometime in 1950-51 Moscow learned that Spanish and Portuguese secret police were tailing de Carvalho and Moraes, and pulled them out. De Carvalho was sent to Brazil. Lister, alias Listytsin, popped up in Colombia. In 1961, the year U. S. Consul William Gibson had his car thrown in the river in Angola for inciting the natives, Lister was with Raoul Castro, handling military matériel furnished by Moscow and Prague. Britain's Labor Government got into the act on March 29, 1961, by setting up a London "Committee for Liberty in Portugal and the Portuguese Colonies," under Sir Leslie Palmer.

1967 found de Carvalho among the leaders of the Brazilian Revolutionary Communist Party cooperating with Carlos Marighela, whose "Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla" has become the handbook of revolutionary terrorists around the world, including the Symbionese Liberation Army of California. On January 17, 1970, de Carvalho was arrested by the Brazilians. On June 16 he was permitted to fly to Algiers with forty-three other terrorists liberated in exchange for Ambassador von Holleben of West Germany, whom has comrades had kidnapped. In Algiers, under the sponsorship of Algerians who had been educated in the U.S. at CIA expense, de Carvalho set up his new office for revolution.

THE DE CARVALHO BUREAU IN ALGIERS included José Sargas, of "The Spanish Front for National Liberation," and de Carvalho's staff from Lisbon. An Arab named Hadj Ali was in charge of Palestinian and Arab co-operation with terrorists in Spain, Portugal and Latin America. Over 2,900,000 Arabs, North Africans and Palestinians worked by Hadj Ali's inflammatory propaganda were in Latin America, and with the islamization of Black Africa his potential for trouble increased daily. What is incredible is that America, officially and unofficially, supported the aims of people such as these, duping the public as they did so into thinking they were working for democracy.

AMERICAN LABOR LEADERS organized unions in industry-less Africa to spearhead revolutions. On February 14, 1960, the executive council of the AFL-CIO proclaimed: "For years American workers have insisted that their government, its democractic allies and all other forces dedicated to liberty devote their efforts and their resources to helping the people of Africa win their independence."

THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, which dictates and implements American policies, was determined to hasten the bloodbath in Africa. CFR member Lawrence C. McQuade accompanied Irving Brown, labor's traveling spreader of revolts, to Chana in December 1959 and told the cruelest people on earth, "Unite! You have a continent to gain and nothing to lose but your chains!" How many hundreds of thousands were murdered by native tyrants in the years that followed was no concern of Mr. McQuade. Millions of dollars were wrung out of American workmen or provided by CIA to be handed over to African revolutionaries by Irving Brown. He was communism's angel. Victor Riesel wrote of him on November 1, 1962, in a column headed "Labor's Often Lonely Fight," "Irving Brown is one of the few Americans trusted by the Algerians - and virtually every other African land's - anti-communists.....It is Brown whom all Europe considers the free Algerians' closest Western friend." The truth was, Brown was Russia's groundclearer. Less than a month later Algeria offered 200,000 men for the holy war against Israel, and communism's Algerian base for world terrorism was in the making. The moment it became clear that Algeria was "in the bag," those who had used UN, labor unions, student organizations and CIA fronts with high-sounding names to give the Algerian recordApproved For Release 2003/08/25 CNAPPDP80R01734R001900020033-8 rovinces.

As far back as June 1955, six months after the outbreak of the Algerian revolt, a special bulletin of the American Federation of Labor, produced for distribution among French labor union App Coved For Release 2003/98/25: GJARDP80R01731R0019000200338 odes, formerly head of the North African section of OSS, calling on French workmen to sabotage their country's war effort. "The free nations must intervene in North Africa," he wrote. "French colonial despotism threatens the western alliance in North Africa as it did in Indo-China."

There was no despotism and, had outside trouble-makers not incited them, a young generation of educated Algerians would have moved into industry and government and a Canada-Britain type relationship would have resulted: But violent revolution, not transition, was what those preaching treason wanted. Rhodes claimed to be knifing France for the sake of the western alliance. It was the splitting of NATO which he was really preparing.

PRESIDENT SALAZAR'S REPORT TO GENERALISSIMO FRANCO. On June 20, 1960, Generalissimo Franco met President Salazar at Parador de Merida to discuss the Iberian Peninsula's relationship with NATO, and American-directed subversion in Africa. Salazar reported that the AMERICAN COMMITTEE ON AFRICA had sent Frank Montero and William Scheiman to Angola in March 1960 to contact subversives and propose an Algeria-type revolt. Powerful people loaned their names to the American Committee on Africa - Eleanor Roosevelt, Senator Hubert Humphrey, Jackie Robinson, the Episcopal Bishop of California, John Gunther, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., to name a few. Adlai Stevenson, the enemy of patriotism and friend of all leftist causes, was for it. A "Union of the Angola People" organization was set up in Leopoldville to form leaders for an underground movement. By September it was publishing a paper, VOICE OF THE ANGOLA NATION, in four languages, and planning a radio station to be financed by N'Krumah of Chana and Sékou Touré of Guinea, tyrants whose methods of killing suspected opponents fazed Irving Brown and his ilk not at all.

On October 3, 1960, Portuguese Foreign Minister Marcello Mathias went to Paris and again discussed subversion and the Montero-Scheiman visit. He produced a detailed report on State Department trouble-makers who had contacted underground cells in Spain to estimate the chances of Franco's being toppled.

TERRORISM ERUPTS. Shortly after 7 A.M. on March 15, 1961, in Quitexe, Angola, a colored employee in a store pushed his employer toward a rear door, exclaiming, "Go quickly; they have come to kill you!" The massacre had been carefully planned. What appeared to be a morning crowd of shoppers suddenly became a screaming mob, cutting throats and slitting the stomachs of women, children and men. In neighboring villages the scene was repeated. The Bailandu tribe signed its own death sentence by trying to alert settlements. Crying babies betrayed the women and children hidden in Madimba. Savages drugged and aroused to a frenzy by sorcerers wiped out the village of Navola. Behind the primitive brutality was expert direction. Congo-trained forces armed with automatic weapons left a 300 mile path of bodies and desolation through a country where racial discrimination was non-existent. The first objective had been attained: Hatred between blacks and whites. There was no UN outcry about the massacre of innocent women and children.

SUPPORT FOR THE TERRORISTS. From March 3 to 17, 1961, the Executive Committee of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) met in Brussels under Belgian transports leader, Omer Becu - the man who told the Mexicans on April 15, 1962, that the ICFTU "serves no particular ideology or military bloc!" At the Brussels meeting an AFL-CIO action formula was approved: "In some cases it is possible and even preferable that affiliated unions pursue their activities independently in the international field, on condition that the ICFTU be fully consulted." Read: Individual unions will act for the AFL-CIO in supporting African revolts against Portugal, but the ICFTU and AFL-CIO are not to be mentioned.

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Second trimester of 1961 and \$220,000 to clear op Phe Or Contribution of three cents per month was agreed upon for each AFL-CIO member for the next six to nine months, with the understanding that the total "contribution" extracted should not exceed eighteen cents per person and that said money should be used for the formation of a "Union of Angola Workers" in mid-May. Armost a million dollars a month for subversion in Black Africa from which only the West's enemies would profit! Three months later, on May 29, 1961, in Forest Park, Pennsylvania, G. Mennen ("Soapy") Williams, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs told a group of anti-white African delegates that if ever our NATO alliance's interests were to conflict with theirs, American loyalty would be to the Africans.

THE ANTI-PORTUGAL DRIVE GAINS MOMENTUM. Ford Foundation financed a MOZAMBIQUE INSTITUTE to extend the revolt. Edouardo Mondlane, leader of Frelimo, the Mozambique Liberation Movement, was hired as a professor at Syracuse University and began indoctrinating students. The African-American Institute opened its doors at 345 E. 46th Street, New York City, with CFR leftist Waldemar Nielsen as president. Nielsen, a veteran of State Department and the Ford Foundation, hired Brazilian "teachers"—militants formed in Appolonio de Carvalho's old cells - to train selected "students" from Angola and Mozambique. On January 6, 1962, a drive was opened for "specialists" for the Peace Corps. Associate Director William Moyers announced they would be drawn from labor and that Peace Corps strength would be doubled. On January 23 a Peace Corps official in Washington requested that the Corps be granted TOP SECRET stamps for its papers, "because the Corps conducts very delicate diplomatic negotiations."

A mob of unkempt hippies appeared in the sedate Onondaga Hotel in Syracuse, N. Y. They were Peace Corps "volunteers," there for training by Edouardo Mondlane. Where were they to be sent? To Nyasaland, on the borders of Mozambique and Rhodesia. While Mondlane turned the Peace Corps beatniks into a propaganda force for himself, the Newhouse newspaper chain and its Syracuse Post-Standard built up Mondlane. Step by step, methodically, as one would lay the foundations for a building, revolution in Portugal and her African provinces was being prepared.

Month after month news releases of the ICFTU reported transfers of funds to the "oppressed unions of Portugal and Spain" followed by appeals to workers in the 109 countries with labor movements in the ICFTU to pressure their governments into putting pressure on Lisbon and Madrid. Denmark, Sweden, UN, Russia, Red China (through a Chinese African Solidarity Committee), the Liberation Committee of the Organization of African Unity, the World Council of Churches, the Socialist International and the ICFTU poured out contributions and propaganda for revolutions against the West. Though Egypt and the Arabs were running a simultaneous drive to make all Africa Moslem, for the Holy War against Israel, the media of the Western world joined the pro-Black revolution crusade.

On September 2, 1964, the Chinese freighter <u>Heping</u> was unloading arms in Dar-es-Salaam for Mondlane, while three Russian freighters bearing anti-aircraft guns and field artillery for guerrillas trained at Dar-es-Salaam's Colito Barracks were standing by. 20,000 terrorists fresh from secret camps in Algiers, the two Congos, Tanzania and Zambia were about to start massacring natives who wanted Portuguese rule. Methodist missionaries toured America, whipping up sympathy and collecting funds. Planes carried young Africans to Moscow, Peking, Havana and Algiers for training. Despite its formidable numbers this guerrilla movement served only for the softening up.

ALGIFRS, 1964. Here coordinated action for infiltration of the Portuguese army and administration was plaumed. Schools, universities, officers schools and the clergy were to be points of entry. Orders were: Never express a political opinion until cell leaders give the coordinate prantices. CIA-RDRAREQ1731B901900620033-8rs of preparate

tion. Discouragement was sown in the army not through military reverses but by constant repetition of the 'war is unwinnable': CLA RDP 80R01731R00189002003388 ggest that Generals Spinola and Costa Gomez knew they were being used as way-clearers for a communist revolution, nor that Spinola knew the extent to which the dormant communist machine in Portugal had been perfected. In September of 1970 a series of explosions in Lisbon Harbor gave notice that a new movement, the "Armed Revolutionary Action" (ARA) organization was about to repeat in Portugal the tactics reds had perfected in France during the Indo-China and Algerian wars and in America during the war in Vietnam. ARA brochures began appearing all over Portugal and Spain.

IN SEPTEMBER 1973 a group of young officers headed by Major Vitor Alves and Colonel Vitor Concalves met with two lieutenant-commanders from the navy, and a squadron leader and captain from the airforce, in a barn near the farming town of Evora, in southern Portugal. They planned a coup for August 1974. Then came the stir caused by publication of General Spinola's book, "Portugal and the Future." On March 14 Spinola was dismissed from his post as army chief of staff. He contacted friends in Madrid, Brazil and Rome. Monsignor Pereira Gomez, head of the leftist Portuguese wing in the Vatican, told him on Monday, April 15, that Portugal must seek a "political solution" in Africa. Political solution could only mean military surrender. After the Vatican meeting Spinola saw Spanish Prime Minister Arias Navarro, General Diez Alegria, and Senor Edouardo Blanco and allayed their fears. Thus the plotters were assured of Spanish neutrality.

assured of spanish heutrality. NATO Secretary-General Joseph Luns was sounded out, and though a putsch in Portugal meant the possible loss of NATO's vital Cape Verde Islands base, Luns approved. A short time before the coup, Moscow's mystery man, Victor Louis, visited Mozambique, where he had contacts with Frelimo agents and young officers in the army. On Tuesday, March 23, Spinola and his friends used the Brazilian embassy's telex to communicate with co-conspirators outside the country. On March 25 the coup unfolded as planned and when success was assured the red machine put its own plan in motion. Twenty-four hours after the coup, Mondlane's American widow was in London, conferring with members of Harold Wilson's Foreign Office and Mario Soares, the Portuguese socialist. On May 10 she was in Moscow, using the Kremlin's secret communications systems to contact Frelimo terrorists in the field. Plans were completed for launching a Black Liberation Brigade this summer in which American Blacks will join Africans in touching off worldwide demonstrations. Leader of the Americans, it is said, will be a man named The second of th Courtland Cox.

·Irving Brown saw the government's fall as his victory also. The years of agitating through labor unions for just this had paid off. The New York Times was delighted. Its story on Portugal's impending ousting from Africa, and eventually the Cape Verde Islands so important to NATO and America, was reprinted in the Paris Herald Tribune of May 27, 1974, under the heading: "Change Could Help Portugal -- Losing an Empire, Gaining Respect."

The New York Times story and this report should be reread five years from now.

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Milaire du Berrier, Correspondent

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